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FUTURE DRIVERS  
FOR  
STATE ALIGNMENTS

by

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## Thesis Statement

The primary drivers for nation-state alignments have been and will remain *Political Ideology* and *Self Interest*. Over the next fifty years, Western political dominance will diminish with the constriction of global economic interdependence and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. In addition, nation-states will coalesce into multi-polar alliances for economic stability and military security.

## Introduction

*The past is an uncertain guide to the future, but it is the only one we have.*

Max Boot (2002)

*It is impossible to predict the future, and all attempts to do so in any detail appear ludicrous within a few years.*

Arthur C. Clark (1962)

Predicting the future is risky. Predicting the future in the infinitely complex social-political system of nation-state interaction is especially fraught with peril. So, instead of making less-likely predictions, this paper will strive to project probable possibilities. While history is not always a faithful prophet, it is a rational and often reliable signpost for upcoming events. By dissecting past nation-state relationships and consolidating scholarly opinion,<sup>1</sup> one may make reasonable forecasts about the future. As John Foran writes in *Revolutions*, “Thinking about the future . . . is different from predicting it, and seems both less presumptuous and potentially more liberating . . . .”<sup>2</sup> In that spirit, we will *think* about future nation-state motivations and how those interests will drive alignments.

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<sup>1</sup> Note: wherever applicable, a brief scholarly bona fides follows each footnote citation (\*see footnote 2).

<sup>2</sup> John Foran, ed., *The Future of Revolutions: Rethinking Radical Change in the Age of Globalization* (New York: Zed Books, 2003), 3. \*John Foran is Professor of Sociology, University of California, Santa Barbara.

Before fleshing out this project's findings and prognostications, it is necessary to define the title concepts: *Future Drivers for State Alignments*. First, the "future" is fifty years hence -- that is, up to the year 2060. Any less of a forecast would be of minimal use as there are several efforts concentrating on what the world will be like in twenty years. Any more would dilute the actionable conclusions drawn from the study. Projecting out one generation seems to be the maximum for reasonable speculation. Next, "drivers" are those things, both tangible and intangible, that compel states to act (either actively or passively). They can be conceptual (e.g., idealism or realism) or concrete (e.g., economic prosperity or military security). Generally, "state" is a distinct and sovereign entity with recognized borders -- those countries that are either active United Nation member states or are at least eligible to become member states based on the UN Charter. However, there are notable exceptions such as Taiwan, which is technically recognized as part of mainland China but often operates as an autonomous entity on the global stage. "Alignments" are those associations, agreements, coalitions and alliances that states enter into as a matter of national interest. Alignments are cooperative actions among nations and can be formal or informal, voluntary or coerced, overt or covert. Finally, friendship, admiration and political kinship are not requisites for alignment.

For the historical foundation of this paper, 1914 is a useful starting point. Even though war has existed since man's first grievance, the time leading up to World War I is often called the "Pre-War Period." This is so because the Great War and its aftermath spawned many of the enduring state alignments, political entities and social norms that are pervasive today. Since the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, we have fought another world war, struggled through a cold war, waged dozens of other *minor* wars and engaged in hundreds of *lesser* armed conflicts. The airplane, atomic bomb, and computer all came into being, each shaping our world indelibly.

President Woodrow Wilson launched American idealism as the foundation of Western ideological philosophy and world polarities evolved around it, primarily aligned either with or against the West. The League of Nations floundered and the United Nations flourished. Globalism, jihad and cyberspace all became part of the universal lexicon. In other words, much of what we consider to be our modern world -- those things that drive alignments and their manifestations, appeared and became normative since World War I.

As articulated in the thesis statement, political ideology and self interest drive alignment. However, those broad areas encompass many theoretical and actual concepts -- there is no way to encapsulate them all in a complex social-political system of systems. In addition, the individual concepts are not always clearly discernable and distinct from each other. For example, it is difficult to discuss globalization without delving into economics, or address diplomacy without mentioning military power, and so on. The reader will notice that each section in this paper becomes successively longer and more detailed. This is intentional and necessary as the relevance of each topic builds on previous discussions. The same is true concerning the gradual change from historical to future emphasis.

## **Political Ideology**

In *The Modern State: Theories and Ideology*, Erika Cudworth, Timothy Hall and John McGovern postulate that ideology can be understood in different ways;

It can be taken to refer to an unscientific way of thinking about politics that lacks truth because it is unscientific. On the other hand, 'political ideologies' can be understood to refer to different, more rational sets of political ideas that serve principally not to explain but to guide political action.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Erika Cudworth, Timothy Hall and John McGovern. *The Modern State: Theories and Ideologies* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 8. Erika Cudworth is a Senior Lecturer in Sociology and Politics at the University of East London. Timothy Hall and John McGovern are Senior Lecturers in Politics at the University of East London.

Elaborating on this “political action” theme, one may think of ideologies as the systematic collective concepts that individuals, groups, nations and cultures use as philosophical and behavioral guidelines. Political systems, then, are subordinate to their overall ideological design and understanding political ideologies is a challenge because they are largely subject to personal interpretation. “Classic” ideologies may include liberalism, realism, capitalism, socialism, nationalism, anarchism and any number of other “isms” depending on the source. Other not-so-tangible concepts such as religion, feminism and environmentalism can also be ideological influences.

As Andrew Scobel puts it in *Political Economy and Global Affairs*, “people can live under a common government and yet hold distinctive political ideologies.”<sup>4</sup> Ideological theories and models are often interchangeable and concepts from one are frequently used to describe premises from another. So, while ideology is difficult to bound, for the purposes of this paper we will concentrate on Western idealism and the subset of American exceptionalism, globalization as a conduit for Westernization and an ideology unto itself, and fundamentalist Islam as it seeks to gain and maintain an identity free of Western influence.

### **Western Idealism and American Exceptionalism**

In *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*, Samuel Huntington opens his book describing the post-WWI planet as parsed into the “West and the Rest.”<sup>5</sup> He states that Britain, France, Spain, Austria, Prussia, Germany, the United States and others essentially ruled the globe. This is not to imply that Western nations did not compete or go to

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<sup>4</sup> Andrew C. Scobel, *Political Economy and Global Affairs* (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2006), 57. Andrew Scobel, PhD, is associate professor and director of undergraduate studies in the political science department at Washington University in St Louis and a resident fellow in the Center for Political Economy.

<sup>5</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Touchton, Simon and Schuster, 1996), 23. Samuel Huntington is the Albert J. Weatherhead III University Professor at Harvard University, the director of the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, and Chairman of the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies.



war with each other, but that they represented a “multipolar international system” that held sway over every other system.<sup>6</sup> Huntington writes that the Cold War was a bi-polarization between the US and Soviet camps, but he argues the world was still divided into three parts; wealthy democratic Western states, poorer communist societies, and non-aligned Third World nations.<sup>7</sup> Now, Huntington contends, the world has separated into seven or eight major civilizations based on culture that is not “ideological, political, or economic.”<sup>8</sup> Again, the Western “culture” remains a major international entity in his hypothesis. Throughout the book, Huntington concentrates on the West as either a singular subject or a comparative cultural yardstick by which others are judged. The salient point is that Western ideology, led by the United States, has been a primary driver for state alignment. States have either aligned with the West due to ideological agreement and political necessity or have chosen to align along a non-Western path.

One may debate whether America’s influence on Western and world affairs has had a net positive or negative impact. But there is no question that the United States has had a profound effect and will remain a powerful force in international relations. For much of the last century, America has been a major power with the means to impose much of its will on much of the globe. Yet the United States is restrained by self-imposed and unprecedented notions of morality. This phenomenon is fleshed out by Henry Kissinger in his tome *Diplomacy*. Writing of the United States, he says no nation has been “more ideological in the pursuit of historic moral convictions.”<sup>9</sup> These convictions, while largely part of American DNA, were first expressed by President Woodrow Wilson as a product of American *exceptionalism*.<sup>10</sup> Kissinger, like

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<sup>6</sup> Huntington, 21.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid, 21.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid, 21.

<sup>9</sup> Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 18. Henry Kissinger has served as United States National Security Advisor and as Secretary of State, has received the Nobel Peace Prize and is a former Harvard Professor.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid, 46.

Huntington, uses the term “world order” (or more specifically, *new world order*) to describe the historically odd notion of a benign nation reluctantly accepting its leadership responsibilities while simultaneously resisting imperialist temptation. Whether one agrees with Kissinger’s premise or whether one believes exceptionalism is a “good thing” is not as important as understanding that Western ideology and subsequent state alignments are often driven by the American *need* to influence other nations -- to spread the gospel of idealism.

Kissinger states that while Wilson’s idealist legacy of “collective security” has been derided by historians, it remains the foundation of American diplomatic strategy to the present day.<sup>11</sup> American presidents have mostly followed Wilson’s dictum or, at least cocooned their realist objectives in his idealist language. American idealism often drives a greater Western idealism -- where the US goes, other Western nations often follow.

This takes us to globalization, which many feel is more accurately described as *Western* globalization. Technology and trade have become useful avenues to carry the Western idealist message and to satisfy American exceptionalist convictions.

## **Globalization**

There is much discussed and written about globalization, but there is no universal consensus as to what it is. One might describe it as a world that is becoming a “smaller place,” trending towards a more homogeneous society and culture. In *Globalization and War*, Tarak Barkawi states globalization “is about the circulation of people, goods, and ideas around the planet”<sup>12</sup> and an inevitable process occurring in the world economy.<sup>13</sup> This imagined “global village” concept is recognized by many to mean the nature of cultural change that started around

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<sup>11</sup> Kissinger, 30.

<sup>12</sup> Tarak Barkawi, *Globalization and War* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006), x. Tarak Barkawi is a lecturer at the Center of International Studies, University of Cambridge.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid, 1.

the 1960s with the advent of global communication.<sup>14</sup> Others cite the change that occurred with the implementation of the World Wide Web in 1985.<sup>15</sup> But Andrew Scobel disagrees that globalization is anything that “new.” He notes the “theoretical underpinnings” for globalization were devised in the nineteenth century.<sup>16</sup> So, globalization may not be a recent happening, but it certainly has become a topic of recent concern.

Many would argue that globalization is just a technological or economic phenomenon and not a nation-state driver. Thomas Friedman describes globalization as a “Flat World,” one leveled by technology and geoeconomics.<sup>17</sup> Friedman contends that since 2000, the world started shrinking from “size small to size tiny,” what he calls “Globalization 3.0.”<sup>18</sup> And while many see globalization as an encroachment, Friedman notes that it requires cooperation on the part of the target audience. To bolster his argument, Friedman writes that in the 1990s China, India, Russia, Eastern Europe, Latin America and Central Asia all opened their economies and political systems to join the free market. Three billion people voluntarily converged on the leveled playing field to “horizontally collaborate.”<sup>19</sup> In other words, three billion collaborators aligned themselves and their nation-states within the globalized marketplace.

However, globalization is about more than economics. Writing in *Globalization and Contestation*, Ronaldo Munck calls globalization “the great overarching paradigm of our era,”

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<sup>14</sup> Samir Dasgupta, ed., *The Changing Face of Globalization* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, Inc., 2004), 16. Samir Dasgupta is Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Kalyani, West Bengal.

<sup>15</sup> Lionel F. Stapley, *Globalization and Terrorism: Death of a Way of Life* (London: Karnac Books, 2006), 54. Lionel Stapley, PhD, is the Director of OPUS (Organization for Promoting Understanding of Society).

<sup>16</sup> Scobel, 160-161. Scobel writes;

... the globalization of market relations and the accompanying transformation in political and social relations was underway well before the latter half of the twentieth century. Modern globalization began a century earlier, linking the political economies that made up the Atlantic economy and helping to fuel their economic and political transformations. Nineteenth-century economists, philosophers, and policymakers devised the theoretical underpinnings of today’s economic globalization and pushed for the policy reforms that started us down the road of increasing interdependence and global capitalism.

<sup>17</sup> Thomas L. Friedman, “It’s a Flat World, After All,” *Global Issues*, 07/08 (Dubuque, IA: McGraw Hill, 2008), 7. Thomas Friedman is an op-ed writer for the *New York Times* and has received two Pulitzer Prizes for journalism.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid*, 8.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid*, 9.

one that dominates the “cultural matrix.”<sup>20</sup> In addition, it “is a ‘grand narrative’ as powerful, all-embracing and visionary as any that may have preceded it, including those of classical capitalism, colonialism or socialism.”<sup>21</sup> Munck’s contention is that globalization shapes all human activity and that, as his title implies, there is a movement to counter it. To support Munck’s claim, one need look no further than regular protests of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization -- all targets for anti-globalization demonstrations.<sup>22</sup> Clearly, if globalization influences so many who feel it has political and ideological impact (both negative and positive), then globalization can drive alignment.

Munck believes globalization is changing traditional nation-state government roles from that of “commanding” society to “steering it” instead.<sup>23</sup> That is, nation-states are abrogating some of their power in the interest of *global governance*. Munck tells us the anti-globalization movement’s battle cry is “no globalization without representation.”<sup>24</sup> Herein lays the reason why some resist globalization and why the nation-state will remain the dominant “lobby” for individual citizens. Many people will not normally relinquish the representation and shared power that the state provides -- more global governance means more dilution of individual interests and collective muscle.

As noted earlier, globalization is often seen as a Western infringement, an encroachment to be resisted. Despite assurances of benevolent intent, non-Western nation-states are often suspicious or even hostile towards Western meddling, what Huntington describes as the “West’s

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<sup>20</sup> Roaldo Munck, *Globalization and Contestation* (New York: Routledge, 2007), ix-1. Ronaldo Munck is the Theme Leader for Internationalism, Interculturalism and Social Development (IISD) at Dublin City University, Ireland.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid, 1.

<sup>22</sup> RTE News, “Collection of Articles,” *New World Disorder*, 2002, [http://www.rte.ie/news/features/new\\_world\\_disorder/](http://www.rte.ie/news/features/new_world_disorder/). (Accessed 31 Jan 2009)

<sup>23</sup> Munck, 10.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid, 61.

universalist pretensions.”<sup>25</sup> In other words, that Western ideological philosophy centered on democracy and capitalism is naturally recognized as the “best” -- a common good. In *Globalization and Terrorism: Death of a Way of Life*, Lionel Stapley states that Western globalization is seen as a threat to Muslim society. Many Muslims feel Western globalization is destroying Muslim cultural “sameness” leading to a loss of identity.<sup>26</sup> Consequently, Muslims seek ways to oppose globalization and they often find common purpose in fundamentalist Islam.

### **Islamic Fundamentalism**

When speaking of Islamic fundamentalism, Westerners often assume this entails religious zealotry, intolerance or terrorism. But in this case, we are separating Islamic political ideology from purely religious factors or violent manifestations (which will be covered later). The crux of Islamic fundamentalism is the reestablishment of the Khilafah (or Caliphate) which is the unification of political and religious rule.<sup>27</sup> Government subordinated to religious law can be counter to Western sensibilities, but this is not necessarily so. The salient point is that Islam can have a powerful cultural impact for practicing Muslims and can also be a strong political influence for nation-state alignment. The National Intelligence Council (NIC) writing in *Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World* articulates;

The force of ideology is likely to be strongest in the Muslim world—particularly the Arab core where Islam’s diverse expressions will continue to influence deeply social norms and politics as well as serve as a prism through which individuals will absorb the economic and cultural forces of globalization.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Huntington, 20.

<sup>26</sup> Stapley, 15.

<sup>27</sup> Walter Laqueur, *No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: The Continuum International Publishing Group, Inc., 2003), 31. Walter Laqueur, PhD, holds the Kissinger Chair for International Studies in Washington, D.C., has authored several books, and has taught at many universities around the world, including Brandeis, Chicago, Harvard, Johns Hopkins, and Tel Aviv.

<sup>28</sup> National Intelligence Council, “Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World,” *NIC 2008-003* (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 2008), 72. The NIC provides the President and senior policymakers with analyses of foreign policy issues that have been reviewed and coordinated throughout the Intelligence Community.

Islam is experiencing a demographic surge in traditional Muslim regions like Africa, Asia and Indonesia and in newer areas like Europe. The Muslim population in the European Union (EU) is around 15 million and the Muslim birth rate is triple that of non-Muslims.<sup>29</sup> If the trend continues, the EU Muslim population will double by 2015 and the non-Muslim population will shrink by 3.5 percent.<sup>30</sup> John Hutchinson echoes Huntington's warning of this "Clash of Civilizations" thusly;

The current Islamist revival against Western secularism, highlighted by the Iranian Revolution, has not only reshaped politics of states with a Muslim majority, but also fanned a widely ethnocentric reaction in European national states against Muslim immigrants, including in France where politicians of the left and right have expressed fears about the erosion of secular republican traditions by militant Islam.<sup>31</sup>

As Hutchinson eludes, the surge is not just about sheer numbers, it also portends the spread of Islamic political ideology and conflict with "worldly" societies. And the irony is that Western nations often must encourage this changing demographic to support their aging indigenous populations and social entitlement programs.

In *Political Islam, World Politics and Europe*, Bassam Tibi informs us that Islamic migration is not just a technical move from one geographic location to another. It is also part of *da'wa*, relocating for the purpose of proselytizing. Tibi writes that Muslims like him do not migrate "as part of a classical jihad, but instead peacefully, within the framework of the *hijra*/migration."<sup>32</sup> So migrating in Islam is a religious duty practiced by immigrants who bring their Islamic values with them. In essence, this is a form of Islamic colonization -- the spreading

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<sup>29</sup> Barkawi, 139.

<sup>30</sup> Omer Taspinar, "Europe's Muslim Street," *Brookings Institution* (9 November 2008), [http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2003/03middleeast\\_taspinar.aspx](http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2003/03middleeast_taspinar.aspx). (Accessed, 18 November 2008). Omer Taspinar is a professor at the National War College and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, and a Foreign Policy Nonresident Fellow at the Brookings Institution.

<sup>31</sup> John Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict* (London: Sage Publications, 2005), 184. John Hutchinson is Senior Lecturer in Nationalism, Department of Government, London School of Economics.

<sup>32</sup> Bassam Tibi, *Political Islam, World Politics and Europe: Democratic Peace and Euro-Islam versus Global Jihad* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 2. Bassam Tibi is Professor of International Relations at the University of Goettingen and A.D. White Professor-at-Large at Cornell University.

of empire propelled by religious conviction, high birth rates and accommodating host nations.

An ideal colonization is done peacefully, with the consent of the colonized, but Islamic violence is spreading throughout the Western world. Western colonists had no qualms about using force in the past and many Islamic colonists apparently feel the same today.

Technically, there should be no conflict between Western societies that profess religious tolerance and Islamic societies that want to peaceably proselytize. But, of course there is a divergence between Western secular idealism championed by American exceptionalism and Islamic spiritual and political fundamentalism spread by religious pilgrims. The two cultures are competing, not necessarily for the same “hearts and minds,” but certainly for the same geographic regions. The European Union and Mid-East are among the current fundamentalist “battlefields” today -- figuratively (or peaceably) in the EU, and literally in the Mid-East.

## **Self Interest**

Speaking of national interests, Lord Palmerston (Henry John Temple, British Prime Minister, 1855-1958 & 1859-1865) said “We have no eternal allies and no permanent enemies”<sup>33</sup> and this quote has been paraphrased many times as “no friends, no enemies, only interests.” The pursuit of self interest is a compelling alignment driver. Henry Kissinger critiqued Wilson’s utopian view of collective security thusly;

. . . collective security fell prey to the weakness of its central premise—that all nations have the same interest in resisting a particular act of aggression and are prepared to run identical risks in opposing it. Experience has shown these assumptions to be false.<sup>34</sup>

Kissinger’s point is about security, but it applies equally well to all other national interests.

Despite idealist fantasies of universal cooperation, nation-states will not voluntarily subjugate

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<sup>33</sup> Kissinger, 96.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid, 249.

their interests for a greater collective good unless that collectivism serves their vital interests first. And those interests are often centered on *economic* and *military* security.

### **Reduction of Free Markets**

As discussed earlier, many believe that globalization is an economic phenomenon that leads to cultural “sameness.” Contrary to this theory, Barkawi writes that “Globalization does not necessarily produce global sameness but rather a reflexive awareness of one’s location in the globalizing and modernizing process as well as one’s prospects relative to others.”<sup>35</sup> Instead of promoting uniformity, globalization merely accentuates one’s position in the societal hierarchy. As with individuals, the same is true for nation-states. Joseph Stiglitz agrees that “something is wrong with the global trading system.”<sup>36</sup> He contends that tariffs leveled against developing countries are four times the rate charged against industrialized countries. Further, Stiglitz believes that developed countries use subsidies and tariffs as a form of protectionism which inhibits advancement of developing nations.<sup>37</sup>

There are theories that globalization leads to stability, but there is less empirical evidence that this is so. Instead of constancy, some describe the term “global” as an “indicator of change.”<sup>38</sup> Lawrence Freedman writes “There is nothing inevitable about globalization in the form of economic interdependence leading to more peace.”<sup>39</sup> In fact, the economic downturn of 2008 is a case study in economic interdependence causing *instability* instead of the converse. Bank failures, stock market slides and corporate bailouts in the United States have all had a negative impact on world markets which, in turn, have fueled American business and investor

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<sup>35</sup> Barkawi, 98

<sup>36</sup> Joseph Stiglitz, “Social Justice and Global Trade,” *Global Issues*, 07/08 (Dubuque, IA: McGraw Hill, 2008), 62. Joseph Stiglitz is a professor of economics at Columbia University, he has been awarded the Nobel Prize in economics.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid, 62.

<sup>38</sup> Dasgupta, 16.

<sup>39</sup> Lawrence Freedman, *The Transformation of Strategic Affairs* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 31. Lawrence Freedman is Professor of War Studies and Vice Principal (Research) at King’s College, London.



insecurities. The globalized instability has become a self-fulfilling prophecy, feeding on its own emotion and creating more instability.

The idea of an interdependent economy being a “good” thing is a relatively new concept and owes much to the comparatively stable and growing world economy since WWII. But a great deal of the last century was also dominated by *mercantilism*, the not-so-positive premise that;

. . . trade and international flow of capital were good if they disproportionately fed the coffers of a state’s sovereign versus those of foreign sovereigns, and consequently contributed to the political-military might and position of the state.<sup>40</sup>

In other words, instead of being an idealist equalizer, economy can be a realist tipper of the zero-sum power balance scale. As Scobel iterates, conflict is the driver for mercantilism which further drives protectionism, both anathema for pure free traders. Ronald Findlay and Kevin O’Rourke writing in *Power and Plenty* agree. Their words concerning the interwar period between 1914 and 1939;

The Great War was a dramatic, exogenous shock to the international economic system, which did not just reinforce preexisting tendencies toward heightened protectionism. Rather, it led to an immediate disintegration of international commodity markets, a change in the domestic and international political environments and a worldwide reallocation of economic activity . . . When the system was hit by a second major shock, the Great Depression, the result was wholesale protectionism . . . .<sup>41</sup>

Paul Doremus, William Keller and others also counter the notion of globalized corporate sameness in *The Myth of the Global Corporation*. Their research shows that so-called Multi-National Corporations (MNC) are not really global in a collective sense, but just national

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<sup>40</sup> Scobel, 163.

<sup>41</sup> Ronald Findlay and Kevin H. O’Rourke, *Power and Plenty: Trade, War, and the World Economy in the Second Millennium* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2007), 471. Ronald Findlay is the Ragnar Nurkse Professor of Economics, Columbia University. Kevin O’Rourke is professor of economics, Trinity College, Dublin.

corporations that are geographically diversified.<sup>42</sup> Further, these MNCs broaden operations because of state interests more so than market forces. Proponents of globalized homogeneity believe that MNCs are the engine of economic “convergence,” but Doremus and his colleagues state that MNCs are not forcing such a union because they themselves are not converging towards global behavioral norms.<sup>43</sup> MNCs, as a matter of conscious business policy, resist diminishment of their unique national values.<sup>44</sup> Lastly, Doremus et al conclude that not only is the global corporation a myth, but that it is an *American* myth<sup>45</sup> -- another idealist vision that is not supported by facts.

Michael Pettis writes that the current globalization is nothing more than economic integration spurred by a credit boom that will be squelched by pending credit contraction.<sup>46</sup> He writes that what we call economic globalization has happened many times in the last 200 years and is always due to liquidity expansions.<sup>47</sup> This liquidity encourages investors to take risk but that appetite quickly dries up when monetary contraction leads to banking system collapse and declining asset values.<sup>48</sup> Pettis summarizes how this leads to suspension or even reversal of globalization;

Populist movements, never completely dormant, become reinvigorated. Countries turn inward. Arguments in favor of protectionism suddenly start to sound appealing. Investment flows become capital flight.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> Paul N. Doremus, William W. Keller, Louis W. Pauly and Simon Reich, *The Myth of the Global Corporation* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998), 145. Paul Doremus is a Senior Analyst (Tech Admin), US Dept of Commerce. William Keller is Exec Dir, Center of Int'l Studies, MIT. Louis Pauly is Professor of Political Science, Dir for International Studies, University of Toronto. Simon Reich is Professor of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburg.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid, 1.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid, 143.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid, 143.

<sup>46</sup> Michael Pettis, “Will Globalization Go Bankrupt?” *Global Issues*, 07/08 (Dubuque, Iowa: McGraw Hill, 2008), 71. Michael Pettis is an investment banker and professor of finance at Columbia University.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid, 71.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid, 73.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid, 73.

Pettis concludes that globalization “itself will always wax and wane with global liquidity.”<sup>50</sup> His “liquidity contraction” seems underway right now. As of 21 November 2008, the Dow Jones Industrial Average has closed at 8,046, down from its peak of 14,164 in 2007. The year-to-date loss was nearly 40% and the ten worst single-day point drops have occurred in the last two months.<sup>51</sup> As liquidity retreats, protectionism will increase, interdependence will devolve into competition and, finally, free markets will diminish.

The National Intelligence Council (NIC) echoes the protectionist mantra in its 2008 publication. The report details how free markets are migrating away from the Western liberal self-development model due to the increase of state-owned enterprises (SOE) and “state capitalism” as practiced by China, Russia and the Gulf states.<sup>52</sup> Wealth is not just moving from West to East, but is becoming concentrated under state control. “In the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis,” the NIC reports “the state’s role in the economy may be gaining more appeal throughout the world.”<sup>53</sup> The NIC describes this trend towards protectionism as a “global economic rebalancing.”<sup>54</sup> Further, states are also assuming more control over monetary flow and using capital to encourage alignment;

Sovereign wealth funds [SWF] have injected more capital into emerging markets than the [International Monetary Fund] and World Bank combined, and this trend could even continue with unwinding global imbalances. China already is beginning to couple SWF investment with direct aid and foreign assistance, often directly outbidding the World Bank on development projects. Such foreign investment by newly rich states such as China, Russia, and the GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] states will lead to diplomatic realignments and new relationships between these states and the developing world.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> Pettis, 75.

<sup>51</sup> Dow Jones Indexes, “Dow Jones Averages,” <http://www.djindexes.com/mdsidx/index.cfm?event=showAverages> (accessed, 21 November 2008).

<sup>52</sup> National Intelligence Council, 8.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid, 8.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid, 10.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid, 12.

This all indicates a reduction in globalized free markets or, as the NIC states, a “multipolar financial order.”<sup>56</sup> States will seek security by leveraging less of their own capital to insulate against market shocks. Further, states will align in protected “financial centers” or regional economic zones instead of the globalized marketplace that exists today. Finally, the NIC writes that the regional “financiers” will not “limit their influence to strictly financial realms.”<sup>57</sup> In other words, nation-state alignments will coalesce around regional financial hegemons that will demand more from their trading partners than just trade.

Many believe that great state war is less likely due to globalization, and that may be true, but this theory is based on globalization as a stabilizing force. The current global landscape is unstable and instability leads to conflict. As globalization contracts, nation-states will become less interdependent, competition and polarity will increase, and a natural balance of power struggle will ensue. Weaker, less-prosperous nation-states will seek security by aligning with leading “financial center” nations.

### **Multi-Polar Balance of Power and War**

Now we will discuss military power as an adjunct to the economic and cultural polarities detailed above. To protect or pursue vital interests, regional state powers will require military might (or at least align with another nation-state that has it). The number of aircraft, ships and tanks a nation possesses does not in itself explain why military power is a driver of political alignment. However, military might coupled with a credible propensity to use it can be a potent incentive to align. When describing Soviet strength at the height of the Cold War in 1982, Ray Bonds wrote in *Russian Military Power*;

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<sup>56</sup> National Intelligence Council, 12.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid, 13.

The Soviet Union has acquired superpower status, and its voice headed in world affairs, because of, and *only* because of its military might. The status is not in any way due to economic power, or trade, nor is it due to political or ideological leadership.<sup>58</sup>

Since the dissolution of the USSR, Russia and the former Soviet states have certainly lost much of that military respect, but Bonds' point is still pertinent. The deference many nations paid to the Soviet Union then (and arguably to the United States now) was not just about military capability, but also the willingness to use that capability in furtherance of national goals.

While the United States would like to be admired for its idealism and "soft power," there is no doubt that other nations' esteem is at least partially due to a realist appraisal of US military clout. As Paul Mitchell writes in *Network Centric Warfare*;

Processes commonly referred to as 'globalization' are affecting every area of the world through environmental modification, electronic communications, financial shifts, and the evolution of worldwide civil society. Juxtaposed with this multi-dimensional globalization is US military primacy.<sup>59</sup>

One may argue whether US military might drives globalization, but it is logical that military strength enables it. The emerging divergence away from a globalized economy will likely drive multi-polarity and require nation-states to align with regional military powers and join formal military alliances (e.g., North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], Shanghai Cooperation Organization [SCO], Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa [COPAX]). The USSR/US examples above are not meant to imply some sort of resurgent Cold War centrism. But rather to illustrate how military power was a nation-state alignment driver in the bi-polar past and that it will remain so in the multi-polar future. As the world rebalances economically

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<sup>58</sup> Ray Bonds, *Russian Military Power* (New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1982), 8. Ray Bonds is a defense journalist, editor, and publisher. He has written and edited scores of well-respected titles on the world's major armed forces, their battles, weapons, and organization, with specialist knowledge of the armed services of the United States. His works have included *The U.S. War Machine*, *The Soviet War Machine*, *The Chinese War Machine* and, most recently, *Americas Special Forces*.

<sup>59</sup> Paul T. Mitchell, *Network Centric Warfare: Coalition Operations in the Age of US Military Primacy* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 11. Paul Mitchell is an Associate Professor at the Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, and the Canadian Forces College, Toronto.

and reorients politically, there will likely be changes in how military power and war are used to achieve political objectives.

According to the National Intelligence Council (NIC), by 2025 the United States will be “one of a number of important actors on the world stage, albeit still the most powerful one.”<sup>60</sup> In terms of gross domestic product (GDP), defense spending, population and technology, the West (United States, Europe and Japan) will experience a decrease in relative global power and influence. Rising global power nations include India, Russia, Brazil and especially China;

Few countries are poised to have more impact on the world over the next 15-20 years than China. If current trends persist, by 2025 China will have the world’s second largest economy and will be a leading military power.<sup>61</sup>

The NIC notes this change is due to an emergence of multipolar entities that “portends less cohesiveness and effectiveness in the international system.”<sup>62</sup> India will seek to exploit this change by serving as a “political and cultural bridge between a rising China and the United States.”<sup>63</sup> And counter to China’s likely aspirations of regional hegemony, the NIC states India will seek to maximize autonomy by “not aligning with any country or international coalition.”<sup>64</sup> While India voluntarily pursues a middle non-alignment strategy, Japan may unwillingly become a new political battleground between China and the United States. Japan will naturally try to maintain cordial relations with its Asian neighbor, but China’s increasing military strength may drive Japan closer to the United States.<sup>65</sup> Japan could find itself in the difficult position of maintaining close relationships with two fierce rivals which is liable to antagonize both.

While China and India are growing, they are still expected to lag the West in terms of individual wealth and absolute GDP. But rising standards of living in both nations will lead to

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<sup>60</sup> National Intelligence Council, 29.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid, 28-29.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid, 29.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid, 30.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid, 30.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid, 34.

higher expectations from their populations which could foment unrest. If expectations are not met, then the populace becomes impatient and “few people have had grounds for such high expectations as do the Chinese.”<sup>66</sup> This new multi-polar landscape will doubtless drive nation-state alignments and all this foreshadows increased competition, instability, and the potential for clashes and even war. As such, it is necessary to discuss future conflict.

What constitutes war and how wars will be fought are matters of much scholarly debate. Since war is a very visible example of political discourse, predictors of societal evolution often use war to bolster their own arguments or criticize others. The only consensus seems to be that while the nature of war remains the same, the character of war will change. A few thoughts on future war;

. . . the day of total wars has passed, and that from now on limited military operations are the only ones that can conceivably serve any coherent purpose.

George Kennan (1954)<sup>67</sup>

War is not only an example of globalization, it is one of the principal mechanisms of globalization, a globalizing force.

Tarak Barkawi (2006)<sup>68</sup>

Wars are at least as likely today as any time over the past century.

Gabriel Kolko (2006)<sup>69</sup>

Regardless of how future war will be fought, Colin Gray states in *Another Bloody Century* that the “political fuel propelling societies to war over the next few years should be discernible today.”<sup>70</sup> Alignment drivers can be thought of as that “political fuel.”

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<sup>66</sup> National Intelligence Council, 30.

<sup>67</sup> Lester, Richard I. and A. Glen Morton, eds., *Concepts for Air Force Leadership*, “The Military in the Service of the State” by Sir John Winthrop Hackett (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 2001), 76.

<sup>68</sup> Barkawi, 92.

<sup>69</sup> Gabriel Kolko, *The Age of War: The United States Confronts the World* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2006), 174. Gabriel Kolko is distinguished research professor emeritus at York University in Toronto.

<sup>70</sup> Colin S. Gray, *Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare* (London: Phoenix, Orion Books, 2005), 21. Colin Gray is Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, United Kingdom.

As Clausewitz writes, war is “a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.”<sup>71</sup> Even after the “war to end all wars” concluded, nation-states have had plenty of war-like “political intercourse.” Since the Treaty of Versailles was signed there have been dozens of wars, uprisings, occupations, invasions, revolutions, rebellions, crises, intifadas, incursions and conflicts all around the world. There is no reason to believe this tendency will abate. However, there has been a significant trend away from direct great power conflicts and towards weaker state border and civil wars. In addition, irregular combat and terrorism are replacing traditional force-on-force engagements.

Ann Hironaka, writing in *Neverending Wars*, has noted that since World War II, the average number of *new* civil wars has remained constant at around two per year.<sup>72</sup> However, the average duration of those wars has increased from approximately 1.5 to 4 years and, consequently, the total number of *ongoing* civil wars has increased from approximately three to seventeen.<sup>73</sup> Another trend she found is that recent civil wars are being fought by newly independent states. She determined there were three reasons for this development. First, strong states offer opportunities for non-violent political change as well as formidable obstacles to those engaging in violent resistance.<sup>74</sup> Obviously, the “opportunities” she speaks of are more relevant in a self-determinant nation, but it is clear that any “strong” state does not become so without the ability to quell internal uprisings. Second, the Cold War precipitated civil “proxy wars.”<sup>75</sup> That is, smaller wars were sponsored by the Soviet Union and the United States as part of the larger Cold War competition. Third, since 1919 much of the natural selection of statehood has been

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<sup>71</sup> Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds., *Carl Von Clausewitz: On War* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), 87. Michael Howard is Professor of History at Yale University and Peter Paret is Professor in the School of Historical Studies of the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton University.

<sup>72</sup> Ann Hironaka, *Neverending Wars* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2005), 4. Ann Hironaka is Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of Minnesota.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid*, 4.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid*, 81.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid*, 104.



removed by international systems. Prior to the League of Nations and the United Nations, only reasonably strong states formed and survived, weak states were absorbed or co-opted. A classic example is Poland, a nation partitioned, occupied and conquered on a regular basis. The strong state dynamic has changed -- now states owe their existence to an international system that offers reasonable security but also locks problems into a specific geographical area and creates conditions that lead to civil wars.<sup>76</sup> As war is evolving, so too are military preparations to fight future wars.

Much has been made of “revolutions” in military affairs that center on transformation and cyber-centricism. But in reality, the current revolution in military affairs (RMA) is just a steady evolution of proven tactics, procedures and technology. As Lawrence Freedman writes, the assumed “technological dynamic” pursued by the West in the aftermath of Desert Storm is nothing more than a reinforcement of views already held by the Western military establishment.<sup>77</sup> While Desert Storm was a tour de force of maneuver warfare, it was also waged against a regime and a plan that could not have been better positioned to be beaten by Western methods. Potential adversaries, especially the Chinese and Islamic fundamentalists, have studied the Gulf War extensively and it is naive to assume they would ever allow themselves to be attacked with the same disadvantages that Saddam Hussein did. In other words, our current “RMA” is likely counterproductive. The West is preparing to fight wars against “cooperative” enemies when our next battles will be fought against non-traditional adversaries using asymmetric methods to circumvent our strengths. Freedman writes further;

The obvious point found in much of the commentary on the RMA, is that those who are almost bound to lose wars fought on Western terms have every incentive to adopt alternative strategies that play to their advantages. . . . If the promise of precision warfare lies in keeping casualties and economic damage down on both sides and

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<sup>76</sup> Hironka, 7.

<sup>77</sup> Freedman, 13-14.

confining them largely to the military sphere, the same logic might lead those seeking to discourage Western military action to adopt tactics and weapons that have exactly the opposite effects.<sup>78</sup>

The potential great power adversaries that these evolutions are designed to counter may become less of a direct threat. And there is a growing indirect threat that cannot be countered solely by advanced technology or advanced weaponry. Speaking of the West's affinity for technology, Paul Mitchell states that "setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan may have tempered some enthusiasm for the strategic impact networks were supposed to have . . . ."<sup>79</sup> Instead, future wars may require low-technology "boots on the ground," human intelligence, counter-insurgency techniques, and non-traditional warfare which means the predicted obsolescence of some militaries is not a forgone conclusion. Interoperability is not such a disadvantage in non-conventional conflicts. In fact, low-technology specialization can be an asset for military alliances and nation-state alignments. Hans-Christian Hagman describes this model in *European Crises Management and Defense: The Search for Capabilities*. He writes that;

'Jointness' and interoperability within NATO remain key challenges. The transatlantic gap will not close given the rapid pace at which the US is acquiring new high-tech assets. The European focus on crisis management is in stark contrast to the US attention to high-tech warfare and homeland defense.<sup>80</sup>

To compensate for the ever-widening gap, Hagman postulates that the "EU's comparative advantage lies not in high-intensity warfare," but in crisis prevention and management with civilian and military means.<sup>81</sup> So even if the European Union does not achieve high-tech parity with the US, it can still leverage its strengths into the joint military whole. The high-tech/low-tech (or major military/minor military) mix in the US/EU or US/Japan mold could also be

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<sup>78</sup> Freedman, 51.

<sup>79</sup> Mitchell, 71.

<sup>80</sup> Hans-Christian Hagman, *European Crisis Management and Defense: The Search for Capabilities* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 103. Dr. Hans-Christian Hagman is a Senior Advisor at the Swedish Ministry of Defense and was a Research Associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid, 104.

replicated with other alignments such as China/Korea (unified)/Taiwan/Japan, Iran/Pan-Arab states, Brazil/South America, Russia/Venezuela/Cuba, EU/Balkans/Ukraine/Turkey, and Iran/Indonesia/Turkey. Note that these possible alignments do not follow the text book WWI-era European “balance of power” template. Natural alignments do occur amongst neighbors, but can also span separate geographical regions and cross cultural divides.

Earlier we discussed the political and cultural features of Islamic fundamentalism. Now we shall examine the military aspects. The NIC believes that the predominately Islamic states of Indonesia, Turkey and Iran are “well-situated for growing international roles.”<sup>82</sup> All three are experiencing economic expansion and a growing middle class. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and Iran’s nuclear program could trigger a Mid-East nuclear arms race<sup>83</sup> and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are not yet finished. This instability has traditional military implications, but many Westerners are concerned about the forceful spread of Islam and the use of terrorism to do so.

As Clausewitz states, war is “composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity,”<sup>84</sup> which is surely how a terrorist approaches the fundamentalist task of warfare. One may argue that terrorism is not a true component of military power in the nation-state sense. But one can make a case that terrorist acts in the name of Islam are military-like in a trans-national sense. That is, terrorism has become a preferred form of asymmetric warfare for the Islamic fundamentalist army. This symbiosis was articulated by Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928. He announced; “Islam [is] both a religion and a state. The Koran and the sword [are] inseparable.”<sup>85</sup> John Hutchinson concurs when he calls Islam a “triumphant

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<sup>82</sup> National Intelligence Council, 35.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid, 61.

<sup>84</sup> Howard and Paret, 89.

<sup>85</sup> Laqueur, 32.

military religion” that is experiencing a “resurgence of radical Pan-Islamic movements.”<sup>86</sup> This contention is explained by Quintan Wiktorowicz in his book, *Radical Islam Rising*. When describing militant Islam (specifically the group al-Muhajiroun), he writes;

. . . the straight path of Islam requires that Muslims struggle to establish an Islamic state via a military coup wherever there are Muslims, publicly demonstrate and call for jihad, and educate others about their Islamic duties, including support for violence.<sup>87</sup>

Wiktorowicz and others postulate that fundamentalism’s increasing influence and violence will beget new polarities and alignments -- Islam versus non-compliant Muslim states (akin to restoration of the Ottoman Empire), Islam versus the West and, ultimately, Islam versus the rest of the world. Iran and Afghanistan represent current fundamentalist conflicts against Muslims and the West, but Colin Gray calls the future struggle against terrorism one of war’s “grand narratives.”<sup>88</sup> Bassam Tibi describes Islamic inroads into Europe as something that will result in a “Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam”<sup>89</sup> and Walter Laqueur warns that India, Central Asia, and the Caucasus will likely become Islamic “battlefields of the future.”<sup>90</sup> Whether one agrees with the above geographic specificities is not as important as understanding that Islamic fundamentalism is apt to remain a long-term influence on trans-national and national state alignments.

It is probable the West will continue to counter or moderate fundamentalist expansion and it is useful to analyze how successful that campaign might be. As long as the US is willing to maintain significant military forces in Iraq, the secular state of the government and overall regional stability can remain at manageable levels. But one must ask if the social experiment in Iraq will extend democracy throughout the greater Middle East? This is doubtful as long as the

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<sup>86</sup> Hutchinson, 185-186.

<sup>87</sup> Quintan Wiktorowicz, *Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), 205-6. Quintan Wiktorowicz is an author and editor of *Islamic Activism*.

<sup>88</sup> Gray, 159.

<sup>89</sup> Tibi, 153.

<sup>90</sup> Laqueur, 178.

surrounding states have powerful ruling classes that embrace or tolerate fundamentalism. If self-determination were so easily spread by osmosis, then Cuba and North Korea would have joined the democratic fold long ago. Colin Gray summarizes his pessimism thusly; “By and large, the more determinedly the West seeks to shape the future Islamic recruiting grounds for religious extremism, the more counter productive the activity.”<sup>91</sup>

The West may not succeed in controlling the violent aspects of fundamentalism, but that does not mean violent Islamists will coalesce into a united and coordinated movement. The concept of a universal “Muslim Street” is largely inaccurate. Muslims are represented by many races, nationalities, and competing forms of Islam (Wahhabi and non-Wahhbi “humanitarian” Islam). Further, Muslims are still separated by nation-states with vastly different resources and interests and those various Muslim governments are threatened by terrorism just as the West is.<sup>92</sup> Even though most Muslims share a common religion, they have yet to unify around it in an aligned nation-state way. As Samuel Huntington writes, “Wherever one looks along the perimeter of Islam, Muslims have problems living peaceably with their neighbors.”<sup>93</sup> Yes, some Muslims are violent towards the West, but Muslims have a propensity for violence, period. The West is currently a popular target for Islamic violence, but violence is often endemic in Muslim culture. Islamic fundamentalists may succeed in restoring the Caliphate, but it seems more likely to occur through gradual demographic and proselytic assimilation described earlier than through political terrorism.

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<sup>91</sup> Gray, 243.

<sup>92</sup> National Intelligence Council, 69.

<sup>93</sup> Huntington, 256.

## Conclusion

*History does not repeat itself, but it does rhyme.*

Mark Twain (unknown)

For the next fifty years, drivers for nation-state alignments will be bounded by ideology and self-interest. Western influence will slowly wane as the global economy constricts and the cultural balance tips towards fundamentalist Islam. Nation-states will seek economic stability and military security by aligning with regional and philosophical multi-polar powers. War is likely to persist, but the character of warfare will change with a new emphasis in low-tech “divisions of labor” amongst allied partners.

The reader may note only subtle and not-so-dramatic changes in past and future alignment drivers -- this is purposeful. While many futurists envisage revolutionary changes and their sensationalism sells books, it is often intellectually dishonest, ignorant or just naive. As stated in the introduction, my intent was to deal in probable possibilities and leave fanciful forecasts to others.

Many past predictions of flying commuter cars, global cooling, Y2K, the avian flu, or any number of other prophecies never approached the hype attached to them. And many current prognosticators are concerned that natural resources will become a primary driver and conflict catalyst. That is, nations will align and fight for dwindling resources. I am more optimistic because homo sapiens have proven themselves so adaptable. As fresh water sources become scarce, desalination plants will become more economically viable. Gas at five dollars a gallon will make offshore drilling, oil shale exploitation and tar sand mining very attractive. Food is not in short supply -- one need look no further than the over-weight populace of any Western nation to confirm it. Paul Erhlich’s best-seller, *The Population Bomb*, foretold of inevitable

overpopulation and world famine that should have occurred no later than the 1980s.<sup>94</sup> But he and other alarmists incorrectly hypothesize of resource scarcity based on known reserves and present-day economics -- not forecast discoveries or changing market forces. In addition, they assume humans either will not or can not make intelligent choices to accommodate changing conditions (e.g., have fewer children, grow more food, find new energy sources, etc.).

As Mark Twain and others quoted in this project suggest, it can be a fool's errand predicting the future. The conclusions of this paper may turn out to be nothing more than linear tripe, a tangential line of claptrap falling away from the exponential curve of real history. But many learned soothsayers have been wrong because they wildly overestimated change in a system that is controlled by human beings. The writings of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu are still pertinent because they both understood the human nature of war would not change even as the weapons and tactics of war evolved. I certainly do not consider myself in the same league as either eminent theorist. However, I believe this work *may* also remain relevant because it binds the fast-moving *possible* with the more-sedate *probable* of the human condition which is the ultimate alignment driver.

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<sup>94</sup> Paul R. Erlich, *The Population Bomb* (New York: Sierra Club, 1969). Paul Erlich is Bing Professor of Population Studies in the department of Biological Sciences at Stanford University. In a 2004 *Grist Magazine* interview ("When Paul's Said and Done"), Erlich countered his critics by stating *The Population Bomb* was not about "predictions," yet he contends "we are still in deep trouble."

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